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Abstract
This paper explores the consequences of skill biased technological progress on the savings
rates. The literature, both theoretical and empirical, on the causes and consequences of skill
biased technological progress in the past few years has burgeoned considerably. So has the
literature on declining household savings, motivated by the American experience over the past
couple of decades. I present a general equilibrium model where declining savings rates emerges
as an outcome of exogenously driven skill biased technological progress. The link between the
two is attributed to optimizing behavior of altruistic households. In an overlapping generations
model, parents are assumed to derive utility from both spending on their children’s education
and making monetary transfers (or bequests). I show that increases in the growth rate of skill
biased technological change causes a shift in allocations away from bequests in favor of education-
leading to a decline in domestic capital accumulation. The analysis is extended to incorporate
life cycle savings both under certainty and uncertainty regarding the timing of death.
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11 Introduction
The personal savings rate of the US economy since the early eighties has been declining and has now
touched levels below zero. Explanations for this decline are multifarious and unresolved. Candidates
include the changing demographic structure, increasing ratio of wealth to income (reinforced by
a belief of good times in the future), an increase in the discount rate, huge transfers of wealth
to the aged (who have a higher marginal propensity to consume) through public institutions,
increased access to credit allowing greater consumption smoothing, etc.1 From the early eighties
the economy has also experienced what observers believe to be a rapid pace of technological change
with the beneﬁts of this change accruing disproportionately to those with higher levels of skills.
This phenomenon of “skill-biased technological change” is considered to be the cause of a monotonic
rise in income inequality experienced in the past two decades.2
Though traditionally average earnings for the more educated have been greater than that for
the less educated, in the eighties and nineties the diﬀerences have soared. Murphy and Welch
(1992) noted that the college high school wage diﬀerential for all experience levels rose from 40% in
1963 to 48% in 1970 and then fell to 38% in the late 1970s only to soar to 58% in 1989. Restricting
attention to those with only ten years of work experience, the ratio rose from 28% in the beginning
of the 1980s to 69% by the end of that decade. The dispersion in the returns to education is
also reﬂected in the average returns which have undergone dramatic changes in the post-war era.
Mincer (1998) notes that returns grew in the sixties, fell in the seventies to reach a low level of 4%,
then rebounded in the eighties and reached heights of 12% or more in the ﬁrst half of the nineties.
Bound and Johnson (1992) and Katz and Murphy (1992) drew attention to the important role of
the “demand” for more educated and skilled workers in driving these patterns. Kreuger (1993)
suggested that the advent of the computer has had a role to play in these changes. Autor, Katz
and Kreuger (1998) reconﬁrm the above ﬁndings by showing that the wage premium continued to
rise in the nineties and that the most rapid skill upgrading has taken place in the more computer
intensive sectors of the economy.
The literature trying to explain the decline in savings is quite extensive. Gokhale, Kotlikoﬀ and
1See Parker (1999) for a thorough review of these arguments.
2Freer international trade is also often considered to be a cause of the increase in income inequality. However
there now seems to be a greater consensus that skill biased technological change is the culprit.
2Sabelhaus (1996) decompose changes in savings due to cohort speciﬁc consumption propensities,
those due to intergenerational redistribution of resources, changes in government spending patterns
and changes in demographics. They argue that redistribution of resources from the youth to the
elderly and the higher consumption propensities of the latter group can explain the decline in
savings. Gale and Sabelhaus (1999), take Nordhaus’quote above seriously and try to re-measure
savings. For example, after augmenting household savings with data on real capital gains, they
suggest that savings is at its highest in the past forty years. They note that adding human capital,
research and development, and other intangible capital would further raise the savings rate. Parker
(1999) undertakes a thorough examination of existing explanations of the savings decline. He
argues that neither wealth changes nor the changing age distribution can completely explain the
savings decline since they post date the consumption boom . He also rules out the importance
of explanations based on income by age distribution, ﬁnancial innovations and intergenerational
ﬁscal transfers. Parker notes that ﬁnancial innovation can explain a third of the decline and wealth
changes another ﬁfth. This implies that these two explanations are enough to account for more
than half of the decrease. He speculates that since consumption is a forward looking variable, the
consumption boom maybe linked to households learning about high levels of output in the future.
Other possibilities include a shift in household preferences and ﬁnally he does not rule out that a
combination of some of the arguments presented so far might explain the decline but questions the
ability of a monocausal argument.
This paper argues that increasing returns to education may be an important, and as yet over-
looked explanation for the decline in savings. Standard economic theory suggests that investments
in education should rise in response to an increase in its rate of return. This notion lies at the core
of the model developed in this paper. Indeed, Mincer (1998) shows that enrollment rates for the
period 1967-1990 responded positively to the wage premia and predicted that an upward trend in
enrollment was forthcoming. The second element of the model is the assumption that households
are altruistic, and parents care about the amount they spend on their children’s education and on
the amount that they allocate as ﬁnancial transfers. Finally in order to maximize the eﬀective-
ness of their transfers, parents allocate funds to these two types of transfers until the returns are
equalized- an assumption that is fairly standard since its introduction to the literature by Becker
and Tomes (1986). In the presence of increases in skill biased technological progress, parents ﬁnd
it more proﬁtable to spend on their children’s education rather than leave bequests. Following a
3permanent increase in skill biased technological progress, it is then possible to show that the ratio
of bequests to output declines while the share of educational expenditures rise.
After establishing the main result, I then consider some important extensions to the model. A
decline in the bequest ratio is not the same as a decline in the savings rate. Individuals save for a
number of reasons with bequests being only one of them. Other important constituents include life
cycle savings and precautionary savings. To check for the robustness of the model I then extend
it to include life cycle savings as well. It turns out that the conditions which generate a decline in
bequests will also generate a decline in life cycle savings and therefore a decline in the aggregate
savings rate too. Finally, a concern of those working on the nature of bequests, has been the relative
importance of intentional bequests to unintentional ones. To allow for both types of transfers, I
further introduce uncertainty regarding the timing of death. The results continue to be robust.
Allowing uncertain longevity means that the theoretical framework lends itself also to analyzing
the eﬀects of increasing life expectancy in the presence of technological progress. Increasing life
expectancy implies that individuals will save more for retirement, will allocate less to their children
and accidental bequests will also fall. Therefore, increasing life expectancy will have both positive
and non positive eﬀects on savings. I show that it is possible that increases in life expectancy can
not only reduce bequests but life cycle savings in the long run as well.
In addition to suggesting a novel explanation for the savings decline, the model draws attention
to the possible trade-oﬀ between physical capital accumulation and human capital accumulation.
The macroeconomic consequences of whether intergenerational transfers are in the form of ﬁnancial
or human wealth was recognized by Blinder (1976). He observed that human capital transfers enter
into the consumption expenditure side of the national income account whereas ﬁnancial bequests
enter the savings side. The recent work in economic growth (e.g. Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992))
has argued that the human capital stock in an economy is an important factor in explaining
diﬀerences in growth rates across nations. Our model suggests that the decline in the savings rate
is nothing but the failure on the part of the national accounts to reﬂect a change in the nature of
accumulation by the household: an endogenous substitution of human capital wealth for ﬁnancial
wealth in a period where technological improvements favor skills.
Given that there are so many competing explanations for the savings decline, how much more
of a story can human capital contribute? To consider the argument presented here, one needs to
look at the magnitude of changes in investment in human capital. In practice, the true measure of
4investment in human capital is anybody’s guess. The share of aggregate education expenditures, in
GDP has hardly changed over the past few decades and hovers at around seven percent. However
these are direct expenditures and do not include opportunity costs and activities which are com-
plementary to human capital. Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1990) attempted to measure investment
in education based on its contribution to output (i.e. an incomes based approach as opposed to
a cost based approach). If one looks at education’s contribution only to market based activities,
their estimate of aggregate investment in education as a share of GDP turns out to be 45%. Mincer
(1990) in his comment on their paper noted that the rate of discount used by Jorgenson and Frau-
meni was half of what it should have really been. That reduces the percentage roughly to 22.5%-
still a very high number. Mincer himself prefers cost based approaches and notes that investment
in education would end up being 14% of GNP (However, in his 1998 paper, Mincer quotes a lower
share of 9.1% of GNP for 1980 of which 5% is in post secondary education). Adding on the job
training takes this number up by another 6% to 20%. Though not related to the model presented
here, one can conjecture that investment in on the job training is likely to rise during periods of
rapid technological change.
To get an idea of the changes in investment in education, as a starting point it is useful to look
at what happened to enrollments in higher education during the period in which savings declined. If
one concentrates on the period from 1984 (the last year in which the US experienced a double digit
savings rate and declined almost monotonically from then on) to 1998, it turns out that enrollment
rates during this period jumped up by 26%. Figure 1 depicts the movement of the enrollment rate
in college for the 18-29 cohort.It suggests that the percentage attending an institution of higher
education jumped by almost 45% during the entire period 1980-98. Further there is an a clear
upward spike from 1986 onwards. Mincer’s prediction that there should be a supply response
seems to have borne out. These trends suggest that there must have been a sizeable increase in
investments in education.
In order to get some sense of how much education expenditures might have risen, I undertook
a crude extrapolation from the numbers provided in Mincer (1998). He notes that adding oppor-
tunity costs and direct expenditures on post secondary education implies a share of 5.0% for post
secondary education in 1980. Between 1980-1998 enrollments have risen by 37%. Roughly, this
means an increase in the share of education relative to GNP of 1.88% during that period. During
the same period personal savings as a share of GNP fell from 7.4% to 2.6%, implying that increased
5expenditure on education can potentially explain 39% of this decline. Though this might seem like
an overestimate, it is also conservative in the sense that it increases expenditures only based on
increases in enrollments and rules out increases simply because individuals are willing to spend
more per head in the face of increasing returns.
To derive an alternative estimate of the possible magnitude of the role of expenditures in
education in explaining the savings decline, I looked at the weights given to education expenditures
in the consumer price index over the years. These weights include only tuition, books and fees
and no other expenditures and stand at a paltry 2.62% in 1998 (this translates to a 2.5% share
in terms of personal disposable income). In 1980 this number was even lower at 0.87% (which
translates to 0.76% of personal disposable income). Between 1980 and 1998 the savings rate as a
share of personal disposable income fell by 6.5%. Based on these numbers increases in educational
expenditures as a share of personal disposable income, can explain 28.2% of the savings decline.
If we close in further to the period 1984-98, which is at the heart of the savings decline, personal
savings as a share of personal disposable income declined by 4.5 percentage points from 8.2% to
3.65%, while the share of education rose by 0.9% points. This also suggests a prima facie case for
explaining almost 23% of the decline in the savings rate.
Clearly both these exercises suggest that increasing returns to education is likely to have had
an important role in explaining the savings rate. One could easily argue that direct measures such
as these do not capture the entire picture and can even be underestimates. Measures of investment
in human capital do not generally include activities complementary to formal education. This is
particularly to true in the case of pre college education. As the returns to college education rise,
and securing admission becomes more competitive, parents to spend a lot more on their children’s
school education. This includes but is not restricted to costs incurred in tutoring and extra-
curricular activities (which one might argue increases the “cognitive skills” of the child) in order
to enhance their children’s prospects.3 Adding on the job training would presumably increase the
importance of education spending specially in a period during which rapid technological change
forces ﬁrms to retrain their workers.
In addition to the late twentieth century, are there any other periods during which the negative
3In addition to underestimating investment in education in the accounting sense, there is anecdotal evidence
suggesting increasing “time costs” have been ignored as well. See “The Parent Trap”, Cover story in Newsweek (Jan
29, 2001).
6relationship between savings and the return to education might be operative? Figure 2 plots the
movements of returns to education, the personal savings rate and the private savings rate through
the previous century for the United States. The savings rates are annual data from the national
accounts while the return to education are decade estimates for returns to college for young men
from Goldin and Katz (1999). The graph, which also includes smooth quadratic ﬁts for all three
variables, seems to suggest that a strong negative relationship might have persisted between the
two upto 1950 as well and again in the seventies. Only during the ﬁfties and the sixties does the
negative relationship seem not to hold.4
The theoretical framework in this paper relies on the assumption that intergenerational transfers
are an important source of capital accumulation in the economy. The contribution of such transfers
relative to life cycle savings as the primary source of wealth accumulation was ﬁrst brought to
attention by Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981). They suggested that almost eighty percent of the
stock of wealth accumulated by households in 1974 was attributable to intergenerational transfers.
In addition to stocks, they also looked at ﬂows and estimated that intergenerational transfer ﬂows
may have been as high as sixty ﬁve percent of household wealth. Further, they noted that this
number is likely to be biased downwards since it did not include gifts not recorded in any data
source.
Within intergenerational transfers, one may distinguish between bequests and other types of
transfers such as tuition support, loans and transfers of businesses to children. This question of
inclusion is one of the main points of disagreement between the proponents of the intergenerational
transfers and proponents of the life cycle savings story- best exempliﬁed in the debate between
Kotlikoﬀ (1988) and Modigliani (1988). Modigliani is opposed to parental support in college edu-
cation as being deﬁned as an intergenerational transfer. He argues that this is a transfer of human
wealth and should not be incorporated into any measure of non-human wealth. Kotlikoﬀ responded
by arguing that as long as the transfer is one of funds, the point is immaterial. Clearly this dis-
tinction is germane to the modeling strategy here. The model relies on a distinction between the
two not only because the behavior of their respective returns diﬀer but also because education
expenditures, as noted by Modigliani, does not go towards asset accumulation but pays for current
4One can argue that for the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century what should matter more are returns to schooling
rather than college. In fact, the return to schooling also seems to have dropped drastically (from approximately 12%
to 5%) between 1914 to 1950 (see ﬁgure 4, Goldin and Katz(1999)).
7consumption.5 Finally, and here there is less disagreement between the two, is the importance of
intentional bequests versus unintentional bequests. They both agree that a large part of intergen-
erational transfers might be unintentional- precautionary savings and life cycle savings that were
not consumed until death will become intergenerational transfers. I extend the model to include
life cycle savings and uncertain life expectancy and the basic intuition still goes through. On the
whole, elements of the debate are well captured in the framework adopted in this paper. Kotlikoﬀ’s
argument that both types of intergenerational transfers matter implies that the entire optimization
exercise carried out below is not over a variable of insigniﬁcant magnitude; Modigliani’s recognition
of the distinction between diﬀerent types of transfers lies at the center of this paper and both of
their observations on unintentional bequests is also taken care of. Finally, the basic insight of the
model that parents might bequeath less when they perceive their children’s income to be growing
faster was noted also by Meade (1966). However he did not concern himself with issues of human
capital and changes in the nature of transfers. In Meade’s analysis, parents are interested in ensur-
ing that children’s consumption is above a certain minimum. Thus the nature of altruism is also
diﬀerent.
The next section of the paper develops a simple model with bequests being the sole constituent
of savings. Section 3 of the paper incorporates life cycle savings. The ﬁrst subsection deals with no
uncertainty regarding life spans. The second subsection further develops the model by introducing
uncertainty and therefore allowing unintentional bequests as well.
2 The Basic Model
Consider a small open overlapping generations economy in a perfectly competitive world with
unrestricted capital ﬂows. Economic activity extends over inﬁnite discrete time. In every period
the economy produces a single homogenous good that can be used for consumption, investment
in physical capital and investment in human capital. The good is produced by physical capital
and human capital augmented raw labor. The supply of all factors of production is determined
endogenously. In particular the supply of human capital and physical capital is determined by the
state of technology which determines the relative rates of return.
5Though as mentioned above, it is more appropriately viewed as an investment
82.1 Production in the Economy
In every period the ﬁnal good is produced under a constant returns to scale neoclassical production
function that is subject to technological progress. The output produced at time t is,
Yt = Y (Kt,A tHt) ≡ AtHtf(kt); kt ≡ Kt/(AtHt)
where At represents a skill-augmenting productivity parameter. Kt and Ht represent physical and
human capital stocks respectively in any given period, t. The production function f(kt) is strictly
monotonic increasing, strictly concave satisfying the neoclassical boundary condition that ensure
the existence of an interior solution to the producer’s proﬁt maximizing problem.
Producers operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Given the wage rate per eﬃciency
unit of labor and the rate of return to capital at time t, wt and rt respectively, producers employ
the optimal amount of capital KT and human capital Ht, in order to maximize proﬁts, i.e. Kt,H t =
argmax[AtHtf(kt)−wtHt−rtKt]. Competitive factor markets ensure that factor prices equal their
marginal products,
rt = f (kt)
wt = At[f(kt) − f (kt)kt] ≡ Atw(kt)
Ht, the human capital stock is the economy’s stock of raw Labor augmented by an eﬃciency
parameter h,
Ht = htL
where L represents the population in the economy and is ﬁxed and h represents the human capital
augmenting factor. Without loss of generality, I assume that L is normalized to 1. The production
function for human capital, is simple. Human capital for a single individual, in any period, ht is a
simple concave function of the educational expenditures in the past period, et−1 subject to a ﬁxed
cost, ¯ et−1,
ht =( et−1 − ¯ et−1)
θ θ ∈ (0,1) (1)
where ¯ et−1 = A
1
1−θ
t−1 ¯ e. The ﬁxed cost is allowed to change over time since it is unlikely that such
costs remain ﬁxed in the presence of technological progress.
9The world rental rate is assumed to be ﬁxed at r. Since the small economy permits unrestricted
international lending and borrowing the domestic rental rate is ﬁxed at the international value, i.e.
rt = r
Consequently the ratio of capital to eﬃciency units of labor is also ﬁxed in every period at f −1(¯ r) ≡
¯ k and the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor is
wt = Atw(¯ k) ≡ ¯ wAt
From equation(1) it follows that an individual receives a ﬁnal wage of ¯ wAtht.
Capital is assumed to depreciate completely in every period. This assumption ensures that
there is a clear correspondence between inherited wealth in this model and household savings as
deﬁned in national accounts.6 Technological progress is exogenous and takes place at a constant
rate of growth, g,
At+1 =( 1+g)At
Finally, one can note that the nature of technological progress is indeed skill-biased in the sense
that an increase in the growth rate will lead to an increase in the wage ratio of those who invest
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2.2 The household
Most overlapping generations models usually incorporate only one type of transfer -either human
capital or bequests. Usually this depends on the focus of the model. Very few include both. Becker
and Tomes (1986) takes cognizance of both types of transfers and it is their style which is adopted
here. However they are concerned with issues of inheritability of endowments and intergenerational
mobility. A similar preference structure in a dynamic setting is employed by Galor and Moav (1999)
but abstracts from technological progress. Zilcha (1996) incorporated both bequests and human
capital investments into the parents’utility function to study economic growth. However the
functional form is of a constant returns Cobb-Douglas nature where human capital and bequests
6In fact in a closed economy version, the two will be exactly the same. The only diﬀerence arising from the small
open economy assumption is that some of the inherited wealth may be invested abroad.
10enter as separate arguments. In such a setup an individual’s preferences structure might imply
a relatively higher share of wealth being allocated to bequests relative to education spending or
vice versa. One can then compare growth trajectories that emerge under the two diﬀerent cases.
Such a preference structure is obviously too restrictive to answer the question posed here. Ishikawa
(1975) also addresses the issues of investment in children’s education and bequests but is more
concerned with the role of family values and income distribution. A lot of the work in overlapping
generational models of human capital formation also usually assumes that individuals make their
own educational investments. In practice however this is not completely correct. Rosenzweig and
Wolpin (1993) show that intergenerational transfers begin with huge amounts earmarked by parents
to support their children’s human capital accumulation.
In each period a generation is born. The economy is characterized by the coexistence of two
generations simultaneously. Individuals are assumed to care about the total transfer they make to
their children. At any period t, members of one generation (generation, t + 1), are economically
inactive and spend time receiving an education. Members of another generation (generation, t),
work and earn their livelihood. With their income and the bequest they receive, members of
generation t in time period t consume the ﬁnal good, support the younger generation’s education
and make bequest allocations. All transactions take place at the beginning of each period and
shocks to the growth rate of technological progress also take place then. Therefore an individual is
aware if her income changed because of a shock and adjusts expenditures accordingly.
Since an individual is not economically independent in the ﬁrst period of her life, utility is
deﬁned over expenditures in the second period. In addition to her own consumption, she derives
utility from the sum of the value of total transfers it makes to its oﬀsprings. Transfers can take
place in the form of investments in human capital and bequests. Altruism is directed only towards
the young and not towards the old. In any period t, the only source of savings therefore are bequests
of agents of period t.7
The utility function is assumed to be of the logarithmic form and is separable in consumption





t + γ lnωt (2)
7In this economy ﬁrms do not have proﬁts. Hence the terms “domestic” and “households” will be used inter-
changeably when I talk about wealth accumulation from sources within the country.
11subject to,
ct
t + ωt =¯ wAtht + rbt−1 (3)
where
ωt = et + bt (4)
and
α<1,γ<1a n dα + γ =1
ωt is the total transfer made by a member of generation t. The budget constraint says that
the sum of all expenditures is equal to the sum of an individuals labor earnings, ¯ wAtht and her
inheritances, rbt. A superscript t implies that the value of the variable in question was chosen
by a member of generation t. A subscript tell us in which period that variable belongs to. The
superscript is avoided for variables for which there is no such confusion.
Utility maximization implies that the following solutions for ct
t and ωt will hold,
ct
t = α(¯ wAtht + rbt−1)( 5 )
bt + et = γ (¯ wAtht + rbt−1)( 6 )
Given the current speciﬁcation, the model by itself does not provide a method for calculating
how the total transfers should be divided between bequests and human capital investment. The
decision regarding this is assumed to come from an arbitrage equilibrium. That is, the net rate
of return on education and ﬁnancial assets are equalized (Becker and Tomes (1986)). This implies
that, since rt = r is ﬁxed, investment in education will be undertaken until a point such that,
re = r
where re is denotes the marginal rate of return on human capital investments. Given the human
capital production function, the condition can be rewritten as,
¯ wAt+1h (et) ≡ re = r (7)



















t ¯ e (8)
This is the optimal value of human capital investment. Clearly as the level of technology
improves the optimal amount of education increases. Further as the international rate of return
rises, investment in education declines. Substituting e∗
t, one can calculate the optimal value of an
individuals earnings,







Further substituting the optimal value of e∗
t in equation (6) gives the optimal value for bt,









t ¯ e (10)
2.3 Dynamics
In this section, the evolution of the savings rate, the share of education in total output and aggregate
output is analyzed. In order to keep track of the savings rate in the economy, I introduce some
notation: let ˜ yt and yt represent the output per capita and output per eﬃciency unit in period t.
Since the capital stock per eﬃciency unit in the economy is ﬁxed, yt =¯ y ∀t. Then,
˜ yt =¯ yAtht. (11)
Similarly,
˜ kt = ¯ kAtht (12)
The savings ratio which is equivalent to the bequest ratio is the amount of bequests per indi-








Substituting the value of bt from equation (10),
Zt =






























Equation (15) is the central dynamic equation for the model. The stability of the dynamics
are clearly dependent on parameter values. In order to assure that the system does not exhibit
monotonically explosive or contractionary behavior, I make the following restriction,8 :
Assumption 2.1 (1 + g)
1





Proposition 2.3.1 An increase in the rate of growth of technological progress, g leads to a decline














Proposition 2.3.2 Under assumption (2.1), An increase in the rate of growth of technological






















It is easy to see that ∂ ¯ Z
∂g < 0.
Figure 3 shows the phase space for Zt. A positive shock to g leads to both these propositions.
There are two reasons why this happens. In any given period, the agent receives some amount as
a bequest, decided by her parent. Following the shock to the growth rate, this amount remains
unchanged since it was decided earlier but output per capita in the current period rises and thus
lowers the bequest to output ratio. Additionally, the shock to the growth rate raises the investment
made by the agent in her children’s education. This further reduces the bequest to output ratio.
If the economy was initially at the steady state then clearly the savings rate drops and continues
to do so until it reaches the new lower steady state. On the other hand, it is possible that the
economy was initially at a savings rate which was below the original steady state. In that situation,
8This assumption has no eﬀect on the eﬀect of technology shocks on the transitional path.
14an increase in g will reduce the savings rate both in the next period and also in the steady state,
but in transition it may rise.
Finally in terms of output per capita, the economy exhibits balanced growth irrespective of
the dynamics of the savings ratio. Since the capital stock is ﬁxed, growth is driven completely
by technological progress and human capital accumulation. The latter is in turn a function of






Note that this is exactly equal to the rate of growth of education expenditures, ∆˜ et
et with the





While the intuition for the story is simple, one may argue that the model above does not
incorporate some issues very well. In particular, the technological change that seems to drive the
increasing returns to education without changing the returns to capital hinges on the assumption
of the small open economy. With a closed economy such technological progress will be neutral to
both physical and human capital if one were to assume a Cobb Douglas production function (which
is not ruled out by the nature of the assumed production function). Also, it would translate to
total factor productivity growth which has actually decreased and not increased during the past
two decades. To address some of these issues, appendix A presents a static closed economy model
with a constant elasticity of substitution production function. The production function allows one
to clearly diﬀerentiate between technologies that make physical capital more productive and that
which makes human capital more productive. It is easy to show that an increase in the technological
parameter for human capital relative to that for physical capital causes a reallocation of resources
in favor of the former and a decline in the savings rate.
3 Introducing Life Cycle Savings
As discussed in the introduction, the empirical literature on wealth accumulation is divided between
proponents of the importance of life cycle savings and intergenerational transfers.9 In this section
we extend the model to include life cycle savings as well. The ﬁrst subsection presents the model
without any uncertainty involved. Therefore there are no unintentional bequests. The second
9It must be added that there is also considerable support for the precautionary savings hypothesis which I have
not discussed in this paper.
15subsection introduces uncertainty and allows such types of bequests to occur. This complicates the
analysis somewhat but the story still goes through.10
3.1 No Uncertainty
The economy is now characterized by the coexistence of three generations simultaneously. At
any period t, members of generation t + 1, are economically inactive and spend time receiving
an education as before. Members of generation t are working and earning their livelihood. With
their income and also the bequest they receive they consume the ﬁnal good, support the younger
generation’s education, make bequest allocations for the younger generation and save a fraction of
their income for retirement. The third generation live oﬀ their own savings.11
An individual’s utility is now deﬁned over second and third period consumption and from
expenditures on their children. As before, the utility function is assumed to be of the logarithmic
form and is separable in consumption and transfers. For a member of generation t, the optimization





t + β lnct
t+1 + γ lnωt (16)
subject to,
ct




α + β + γ = 1 (19)
Utility maximization implies that the following solution for ct
t,c t
t+1and ωt will hold,
10As far as I am aware, no model has so far incorporated both intentional and unintentional transfers. This is not
surprising since the model does run into more than one diﬀerence equation. However the simplifying assumption of
the small open economy keeps things tractable.
11Note that bequests here are not so in the strict sense of the term. Individuals receive them before the death
of their parents and hence are literally inter-vivos intergenerational transfers which earn a return. It is easy to see
that even if it were a bequest at death, the maximization problem and budget constraints would be unchanged. This
is because the bequest allocation will earn a return for over two periods. That would be compensated by the fact
that it needs to be discounted one period to make it comparable to the returns to investment in education -leaving
the situation unaltered. The only way it would matter is that it would impose some additional liquidity constraints.
Since the model will not incorporate issues of liquidity constraints on education expenditures, this assumption only
plays a simplifying role. Further allowing perfect capital markets would remove this restriction as well. The evidence
on borrowing constraints is ambiguous. Shea (1998), Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Cameron and Taber (2000)
ﬁnd no evidence that borrowing constraints play a role in college choices. However Acemoglu and Pischke (2000)
show evidence that family income is an important determinant.
16ct
t = α(¯ wAtht + rbt−1) (20)
ct
t+1 = βr(¯ wAtht + rbt−1) (21)
bt + et = γ (¯ wAtht + rbt−1) (22)
Similar to Zt in equation (15), one can deﬁne a new variable Xt which is the life cycle savings








The evolution of Xt can be characterized by,
Xt =




















Equation (15) for Zt ((henceforth referred to as the “bequest ratio”), in section 2 continues to be
the main dynamical equation for the model and also drives Xt . As before, the bequest ratio falls











Proposition 3.1.1 An increase in the rate of growth of technological progress, g, leads to an











A simple inspection of the life cycle savings ratio’s diﬀerence equation (26) clearly indicates
that the latter must also fall. The reason is that the second component of the life cycle savings
ratio, the ratio of bequests from the earlier period to the current per capita output, has fallen.
17This component is similar to the component in Zt in equation (15) and the explanation of why
this falls is the same -interest income is based on allocation made in the previous period. Increases
in productivity in the current period raises output per capita but does not alter the bequest of
the earlier period on which interest is earned. This reduces the ratio of interest income to current
output per capita. Note that when one considers savings ratios as opposed to absolute savings, the
pure income eﬀect does not play a role. An increase in income of an individual from higher wages
due to technological progress is exactly oﬀset by a similar increase in output per capita (i.e. the
ﬁrst term of equation (26) is unchanged).
Proposition 3.1.2 An increase in the rate of growth of technological progress, g, leads to a decline


















since ∂ ¯ Z
∂g < 0.
Interestingly, in the steady state not only does an increase in g lead to a decline in the life cycle
savings ratio but the eﬀect is actually magniﬁed compared to the eﬀect on the bequest ratio. This
is because in addition to the direct negative eﬀect discussed already, the fact that steady state life
cycle savings ratio is a positive function of the steady state bequest ratio, means that the former
must further decline because of the decline in the latter.
Corollary 3.0.1 An increase in the rate of technological progress, g, leads to an immediate decline
in the aggregate savings rate, Xt + Zt.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 2.3.1 and 3.1.1.
Corollary 3.0.2 An increase in the rate of technological progress, g, leads to a decline in the steady
state value of the aggregate savings rate, ¯ X + ¯ Z.
Proof. Follows from Propositions 2.3.2 and 3.1.2.
It is straightforward to see that aggregate savings ratio, Xt + Zt is a negative function of the
rate of growth of technological progress in transition.12 Finally in terms of output per capita, the
12There exists a class of models which argue that higher growth causes higher savings rates. To the extent that
growth depends on technological progress, the results seem contradictory. However these models rely on other
assumptions such as habit formation, for example Carroll and Weil (1994). Further it should be stressed again, that
the framework adopted here of a small open economy is purely a modeling vehicle. In the case of the CES production
function in the appendix, technological progress can be skill biased or physical capital biased with the savings rate
rising if it is the latter.
18economy continues to exhibit balanced growth irrespective of the dynamics of the savings ratio.
3.2 Introducing Uncertainty
The controversy regarding unintentional versus intentional bequests in wealth accumulation has
been hotly debated over the past couple of decades since Kotlikoﬀ and Summers (1981)published
their ﬁndings. On the whole the literature suggests that unintentional bequests are more important
that intentional ones. Clearly, if the theory presented here is to have any empirical signiﬁcance,
then it should be robust to the inclusion of unintentional bequests. Incorporating both uninten-
tional bequests and intentional bequests in a uniﬁed model can be problematic. One has to allow for
heterogeneity of agents since wealth accumulation along a dynasty depends on its mortality history.
Abel (1985) ﬁrst introduced explicitly unintentional bequests and derived the intra-cohort distri-
bution of bequests, wealth and consumption. He then went on to analyze the eﬀect of actuarially
fair social security on national wealth. However intentional bequests were not included and neither
were human capital investments. Zhang, Zhang and Lee (1999) develop the Abel model further
to incorporate public education and re-examine ﬁscal policy issues. They also allow the interest
rate to be endogenous. Both of these papers use overlapping generations frameworks and assume
that individuals can live for two periods but a certain fraction of them die at the end of the ﬁrst
period. This creates unintentional bequests. It also means that even though agents maybe similar
at the initial time period eventually there will be a distribution of wealth. The modeling strategy
adopted here is similar in this respect but is quite diﬀerent from then on. This is necessitated
by the diﬀerent preference structure assumed so far in my model: allowing intentional bequests
and human capital. Compared to those papers I am less interested in the actual distribution of
wealth at every time period and more interested in the savings ratio in the aggregate. This does
not mean that distributional issues can be ignored - after all the aggregate does depend on the way
the underlying distribution evolves every time period.
Individuals as in section 3.1, live for three periods but now are face the probability that they
will not survive beyond their second period in life, i.e. they live upto the end of their working lives
but may die at the beginning of retirement. The probability that this may happen is p where p 
(0,1). With the introduction of uncertain lifespans, an individual, therefore now seeks to maximize





t + β(1 − p)lnct
t+1 + γ lnωt (28)
subject to the same restrictions as before (equations (20) to (22) above).
As stated before the problem is that now there are groups of individuals who have diﬀerent bt
given their dynasty’s mortality record. Consider one of these subgroups i. Within this subgroup, all
individuals receive the same bequest, or Zi
t -the bequest ratio. They all face the same probability
of death and have the same budget constraint. And importantly they all make the same decision
regarding how much to invest in human capital, how much to set aside for a ﬁnancial transfer and
how much for life cycle savings. Lets assume that they all decide on intentional bequests of an
amount IBi
t and life cycle savings, LCi
t.13 What happens next is that a fraction p of them will die
at the end of the second period of their lives. Therefore a fraction p of their descendants receive
bequests equal to IBi
t+LCi
t while another fraction receives bequests equal to IBi
t. This means that
in the next generation a fraction p make their decisions based on IBi
t + LCi
t and another fraction
(1−p) based on IBi
t. This seems to suggest that the two variables (Xt and Zt) might follow a well
deﬁned method of evolution in the aggregate. However to be able to do that, as a starting point, I
need to make the following assumption:
Assumption 3.1 At time t =0all individuals are alike and have the same endowment W0.
The above assumption allows for the economy in time period zero to be characterized by a repre-
sentative agent. Further, both b0 (bequests allocated at t =0 )a n ds0 (life cycle savings allocated
at t = 0) will be the same for all individuals. For the rest of the paper, Zt is the average bequest
ratio. This means that it includes both incidental bequests and intentional ones. The word “av-
erage” means that it is the weighted average of the bequest ratios of all groups in society at any
given time period, t (it is easy to ﬁgure out that the number of subgroups in any period is 2t under
assumption (3.1)). In Appendix B it is shown that, indeed one can ﬁgure out well deﬁned paths
for both Zt and Xt and the results are derived more thoroughly. It turns out that the economy is
now characterized by a system of two linear diﬀerence equations,
Xt = a1 + b1Xt−1 + c1Zt−1 (29)
Zt = a2 + b2Xt−1 + c2Zt−1 (30)
13The level of educational investment is spent while they are still alive and therefore that is not altered.
20where,
a1 =
β(1 − p)¯ w




































In order to ensure that the system is stable, the following assumption is made14,





The solution to this dynamical system is
Xt =
((Z0 − ¯ Z)+p(X0 − ¯ X))(β(1 − p))
(γ + β(1 − p)p)
λt
1 + ¯ X (34)
Zt =
((Z0 − ¯ Z)+p(X0 − ¯ X))γ
(γ + β(1 − p)p)
λt
1 + ¯ Z (35)
where
λ1 =








β(1 − p)(1 − θ)¯ w
(1 − βp)
Λ(g) (37)






























Ω (g) < 0
The dynamical system here is governed by only one eigenvalue, λ1. The second eigenvalue,
λ2 = 0, is zero since b1c2 = b2c1. The phase diagram is depicted in Figure 4. Due to the fact that
14This assumption is a slight modiﬁcation of assumption 3.1. It reduces to the left inequality of assumption 3.1
once I set p =0 .
21one eigenvalue is zero, it means that Xt and Zt cannot be at any arbitrary point in the phase space
depicted in the ﬁgure.15 In fact the two variables exhibit a rather well deﬁned path of motion -both
of them must always be on the convergent path AA in time t>0.16 In other words, the movement
of these variables are similar when there were no unintentional bequests. It turns out that this
carries over also for the eﬀects of technological progress.
Proposition 3.2.1 Under assumption (3.1), an increase in the rate of technological progress g,
leads to an immediate decline in the Xt and Zt.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that in the system of equations (29) -(30), ∂a2
∂g < 0, ∂b1
∂g <
0, ∂b2
∂g < 0, ∂c1
∂g < 0, and ∂c2
∂g < 0.
Proposition 3.2.2 Under assumptions (3.1) and (3.2), an increase in the rate of technological
progress, g leads to a declines in the steadystate values of both the aggregate life cy cle savings













=Ω  (g)Λ(g)+Ω ( g)Λ (g) < 0
since Ω (g) < 0a n dΛ  (g) < 0.
Figure 5 illustrates this case. A one time shock to technological progress moves both lines,
∆Xt =0a n d∆ Zt = 0. In the case of the former, the intercept falls while the slope goes up. In the
case of the latter, both the slope and the intercept decline. Corresponding to the increase in g from
g0 to g1, the steady state moves from E0 to E1. A permanent increase in the rate of technological
progress moves the economy to a new convergent path. The transitional dynamics are somewhat
more complex and a simple visual inference can be misleading. Figure 6 (which is similar to ﬁgure
5) shows that the stable path makes a parallel shift from AA to BB.F r o ma n yp o i n to nAA,ar i s e
15Except at t =0 .
16If one were to transform this coupled dynamical system in (Xt,Z t) to an uncoupled one in (Y 1t,Y2t), this would
mean that movement to the steady state would take place along the horizontal axis only. If at time t = 0, the economy
is placed somewhere outside of the horizontal axis, then the economy would move there in the next period and all
future dynamics take place along this axis. For a simple explanation of this transformation the reader is referred to
Galor (1996).
22in g implies that the bequest ratio should fall in the short run. However, simply by looking at the
phase space, it would seem that another scenario (not shown in the ﬁgure) is possible where the
steady state values for both ratios decline but the new stable path is above (and to the left of) AA
(i.e. E1 lies above the old convergent path but remains south-west of E0). This would imply that
an increase in g in the short run actually increases the bequest ratio. However, this is not only
counter intuitive but also mathematically not possible as shown in proposition 3.2.1. Further, in
appendix C, the eigenvector for λ1 is derived and one can show that such dynamics can be ruled
out.
While the mathematics may seem complex, intuitively it is not diﬃcult to see why all the
results carry over from the certainty case. In the certainty case it was shown that in any time
period, t, the life cycle savings rate and the bequest rate were both linear functions of the bequest
ratio in time period, t − 1. With the introduction of uncertainty, in the aggregate, all that really
happens is that for a fraction of individuals in society, life cycle savings end up becoming bequests
as well. Therefore there is only a shift in the composition of savings. Beyond that there is really
no substantial complication in the story. When examining the eﬀects of g on the steady state in
section 3.1, I remarked that the eﬀects on the life cycle savings was likely to be greater than the
on bequests. With the introduction of unintentional bequests, the eﬀects of a change in g is now
obviously less adverse for life cycle savings since a fraction of it always ends up being becoming
bequests.
3.2.1 A Note on Changes in Life Expectancy
An important concern in the study of domestic capital accumulation is the issue of increasing
life expectancy and the consequent aging of society. As aging increases, a few oﬀsetting eﬀects
may occur. For example, life cycles savings will rise while accidental bequests decline. Capital
accumulation could go in either direction. The short run eﬀect would be higher life cycle savings
which would imply greater accumulation. However the higher life cycle savings are completely
consumed in the next period. At the same time accidental bequests are lower. Accidental bequests
however do not translate completely into retirement consumption. They are allocated to life cycle
savings and intentional bequests. Therefore the reduction in accidental bequests implies that the
medium run capital accumulation rate will be lower. Additionally, in terms of ﬁscal policy concerns,
increasing expenditures on social security means lower capital accumulation rates. The framework
23presented in this section lends itself to studying the eﬀect of changes in mortality rates on domestic
capital accumulation in the presence of technological progress. A decline in p in the model is
equivalent to increasing life expectancy.
In contrast to the eﬀects of changes in g, the eﬀects of a mortality decline is more involved. It
turns out that a couple of diﬀerent possibilities emerge for both the steady state and the transition
path. Depending upon parameter values, in the long run the economy may actually face a lower
life cycle savings ratio despite a mortality decline.17 If the initial mortality rate is already less than
half (p<1/2), then further declines imply that the steady state bequest ratio will unambiguously
decline while the life cycle savings ratio may either decline or increase depending.18 Therefore,
there arises the possibility that the aggregate savings ratio might fall. A decline in mortality
implies that individuals allocate more of their resources to life cycle savings and relatively less to
intergenerational transfers and ﬁrst period consumption. The result that steady state aggregate
bequest ratio declines should not then come as a surprise: the fact that the share of education
expenditures is ﬁxed by the rate of technological progress and there is a reallocation of resources
towards life cycle savings means that intentional bequest ratio will decline. Further, the accidental
bequest ratio also declines given the increased life expectancy. What comes more as a surprise is
the possibility of the decline in the life cycle savings rate. A conjecture is that as higher amounts
are allocated to life cycle savings and intentional bequests decline, the amount transferred to the
next generation declines (the ratio that is) and this decline in the ratio leads to the possibility of a
lower life cycle savings ratio by the next generation since all else being equal the amount that they
inherit falls relatively. In the long run thus there can remain the possibility of life cycle savings
ratio also declining.19 This scenario is depicted in ﬁgure 7a. As mortality declines from p0 to p1,
the steady state ratios move from E0 to a lower equilibrium level of E1. The dynamics are almost
similar to the case of an increase in technological progress except that the nature of the shift of the
stable path is diﬀerent (see appendix C for further details).
17 The eﬀects of mortality decline in savings analyzed in this section do not rely crucially on the assumption of
skill augmenting technological progress and one can assume a constant productivity level. However the parameter
assumptions,in particular, on the interest rate, to ensure that the system is stable, will need to be made even stronger.
18As in footnote 17, again, this is a stronger suﬃcient condition. The bequest ratio can decline with a weaker
necessary and suﬃcient condition.
19Zhang, Zhang and Lee (1999) also rely on this argument to explain lower rates of capital accumulation with
declining mortality.
24The traditional result that life cycle savings rate increases also remains as a possibility, accom-
panied however, with a fall in the bequest ratio. In this case what happens to the aggregate ratio
depends upon various parameter values and is more of an empirical issue. Figure 7b shows the
dynamics when life cycle savings ratio increases in the steady state. The movement of the stable
path from AA to BB is similar to that in Figure 7a. In all of the above cases however the eﬀect of
the shock to life cycle savings ratio remains unclear in the transition path. For most values of the
life cycle savings ratio, a shock causes a change in the same direction the ratio was already moving
in (as opposed to the bequest ratio, which in the short run unambiguously declines).
4 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to motivate the idea that in a world where skills are becoming
predominantly more important, one needs to think about how the composition of capital accumu-
lation shifts. Given that it is generally agreed many developed countries in the world have been
undergoing a period of rapid skill-biased technological progress, it is deﬁnitely worthwhile to think
about the relative importance of human capital accumulation vis-a-vis physical capital accumula-
tion. The fact that the savings ratio as measured by national accounts has been declining during
the same period, makes the question all the more interesting. Though skill biased technological
progress need not be the only explanation for declining savings, the fact that it might account
for atleast 25% of the decline, makes the issue important enough to ponder over. To motivate
the argument, I presented a simple model where altruistic parents derive utility from the amount
they spend on their children. Given the nature of the problem I am studying this seems to be the
most obvious formulation. Prima facie, the theory that people will reallocate between two types of
transfers given the changing payoﬀs is appealing. However one needs to investigate how important
this reallocation is in explaining declining savings. Clearly national income accounts are inadequate
since they do not provide ways to measure indirect expenditures in human capital. For example,
as mentioned earlier there are a number of complementary expenditures that enhance human cap-
ital and further there are “time costs” that are also not included. One needs to devise ways to
capture these numbers. Though the model presented here is based on household optimization, to
measure human capital investment in the economy one should add investment by ﬁrms in “ on the
job training”. Further one needs to look at microeconomic data to better capture the fact that
25a lot of this reallocation is likely to take place in households who have children going to school.
Kendrick (1976) and Jorgenson and Fraumeni (1990) tackled the challenge of estimating a more
broad measure of human capital investment and found that it claimed a large share of national
output but clearly one needs to update and improve on those lines of research.
Regarding the model itself, there are other interesting lines along which it could be extended.
For example, I have not included public education which forms a major chunk of educational
expenditures in the U.S. An increase in public education expenditures implies that the incentive
to reallocate towards private educational expenditures is less. However, as a matter of empirical
observation the share of educational expenditures in public spending has not risen during the past
two decades. There are issues about the quality of public education too. If parents feel that quality
of public education is not improving which puts students at public schools at a disadvantage, there
emerges an incentive to complement public schooling with private expenditures. It also suggests
that there might be some not so obvious measures of education expenditures in public spending
and revenue. For example, when families move to better neighborhoods where the quality of public
schooling is better, they pay higher home prices, part of which should conceivably enter as an
educational expenditure. Recent evidence from Florida suggests that the introduction of school
quality rating into communities led to major housing price eﬀects.20 Also I have not considered
the heterogeneity of agents. This can aﬀect the results to the degree that borrowing constraints
are an important consideration in education ﬁnancing. However these could be incorporated and
the results are unlikely to change substantially. The fact that enrollments have risen in college
substantially indicates that there is a desire to acquire skills and increase spending on education.
The model has also abstracted from saving and borrowing for education. One can argue that in
a model with more than two or three periods, parents would allocate more towards educational
savings following a positive shock to returns to education. This argument though theoretically
plausible has two problems. First, such a shock is more likely to lead parents to start spending
more on education right away causing an unplanned decrease in savings. Secondly, as an empirical
matter people have saved far less for college than they typically have to borrow.21 Clearly all these
20See Figlio and Lucas (2000).
21I am grateful to Caroline Hoxby for drawing my attention to this fact and related data. A lot of interesting
evidence on the drastic increase in borrowing for higher education can be found in the web site for the National Post-
secondary Student Aid Study (http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/getpubcats.asp?sid=013). For example, The percentage
of dependent undergraduates with family incomes of $50,000 or more who ever borrowed from federal loan programs
26issues discussed above present avenues for further research.
Finally, the model provides some insights into the empirical debate over bequests and savings.
Though the savings rate in the economy has been declining for the past two decades, there has
not been any eﬀort to estimate whether this has come largely at the cost of life cycle savings or
intergenerational transfers. Also it suggests that in empirical studies, simply looking at intentional
bequests is not the best way to analyze intergenerational altruism. It is perfectly reasonable
to observe insigniﬁcant bequests in households with children without that implying the lack of
intergenerational altruism.
Appendix
A. A static closed economy with CES production function
In this section, the robustness of the result derived in section 2 is examined in the context of
a closed economy exhibiting a constant elasticity of substitution production function. However
since the CES function does make the analysis a little more complicated, the analysis is restricted
to static version of the model. Also, to get a closed form solution the human capital production
function is assumed to be linear in educational expenditures, i.e. ht = et−1. Output is now
Yt+1 =[ ( AKKt+1)ρ +( AHHt+1)ρ]
1
ρ
with ρ<1, which is a standard assumption and implies that elasticity of substitution between
capital and labor,
ρ
1−ρ is greater than one.22 The production function suggests that wages and






















As before, population is normalized to 1, i.e. L =1 .
increased between 1992-93 and 1995-96 at both public and private, not-for-proﬁt 4-year institutions. Further, in
1992-93, 21 percent of dependent undergraduates at public 4-year institutions from families making between $ 50,000
and $ 59,999 had ever borrowed. By 1995-96, 44 percent of undergraduates from families in that income range had
borrowed.
22Duﬀy and Papageorgiou (2000) recently showed that this assumption is valid for developed economies.





t + γ lnωt (41)
subject to,
wt + rtbt−1 = ct + ωt (42)
As before Utility maximization implies,
ct = α(wt + rtbt−1)ωt = γ(wt + rtbt−1) (43)
Since this is a closed economy,
Yt = wt + rtKt
Also now
Kt+1 = b∗




t are the optimal amounts allocated to bequests and educational expenditures
respectively. That is capital per capita in the next period is the bequest per capita allocated in the
earlier period. Also income in any period is now determined by wages and an interest rate both of
which are endogenous.
Therefore e∗
t =a r gm a x
 














Kt+1 − rt+1 =0













































































This means that the amount of expenditures allocated to education relative to bequests increases
as the technology complementing human capital increases relative to the technology complementing
physical capital. Since ωt = γyt, the share of educational expenditures must rise while savings must
fall.
B. Derivation of the Dynamical System in Section 4
The fact that there exists uncertainty in the model in this section implies that even if I start
from an economy of perfectly homogenous agents in period zero, in period t>0 there will be
agents will be heterogenous in their wealth due to diﬀerences in their dynasty’s mortality history.
To be precise, in period t>0, agents can be divided into 2t types. However the important thing
to recognize is that I are interested in the economy wide savings ratio and hence I aggregate over
households. It turns out that this can be done easily if I assume that individuals are homogenous
in period zero. Here I present a stylized version of the method. The variables Xt and Zt used here
are the same as the ones in the text, however I suppress the constants since they will not play any
role in the derivation. Since individuals are all alike in period 0 they all make the same life cycle
savings,education and bequest decision. However a fraction 1 − p of them die before retirement
and p of them die at the end of retirement. This means that the wealth distribution for the next
generation is dualistic. For the , 1 − p fraction of the population whose ancestors lived the entire







For the remaining p fraction of the population, the corresponding decisions are,
X
p
1 = φ(X0 + Z0)
Z
p
1 = ϕ(X0 + Z0)
Therefore the average life cycles savings ratio and bequest ratio in the economy for period 1 is,
X1 = pX
p
1 +( 1− p)X
1−p
1
X1 = p(φ(X0 + Z0)) + (1 − p)φZ0
⇒ X1 = pφX0 + φZ0
Similarly, the average bequest ratio in the economy is,
Z1 = pZ
p
1 +( 1− p)Z
1−p
1
⇒ Z1 = pϕX0 + ϕZ0










1 and a fraction p(1−p) will inherit only Z
p













where the superscripts denote their ancestral ‘mortality outcomes’. Of the remaining fraction 1−p,































1 )+( 1− p)2ϕZ
1−p)
1
30⇒ Z2 = p2ϕX
p








Z2 = pϕX1 + ϕZ1
given the expressions for X1 and Z1 above. One can similarly show that
X2 = pφX1 + φZ1
I have shown that for the ﬁrst two periods the structure of the system is self repeating despite the
increasing heterogeneity of the economy. With a little bit more eﬀort one can show that this is
true for all t. One can now apply this logic to the model in section 2. The terms corresponding to
b1,b 2,c 1andc2 in the main body of the text here are pφ,pϕ,φ,ϕ respectively.
31C. Analysis of the Eigenvector associated with λ1
In order to derive the eigenvector, I ﬁrst transform the non-homogenous dynamical system
described in equations (20) and (21) into a homogenous one and derive the eigenvector from that

































which can be rewritten as,
Vt+1 = A + BVt
Every non homogeneous dynamical system can be rewritten as a homogenous one. In eﬀect the
above system can be transformed into a homogenous system,
Wt+1 = BWt
where,









This system has the same eigenvalue as Vt. Therefore the stable eigenvector associated with λ1
is the solution to,
[B − λ1I]Wt =0


















The above is the equation of the stable path in the dynamical system. One can see that a
decrease in p lowers the slope while an increase in g lowers the intercept.
23See Galor (1996)
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